2 CodeRed, for example, affected more than 359,000 Web servers in 14 hours; Slammer achieved its maximum Internet-wide scanning rate (55 million scans per second) in a few minutes. The high stakes involved have inspired numerous research projects, through which industry and academic institutions are working to strengthen local-area and wide-area networked systems' abilities to fend off cyberattacks.
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ecent Internet worm outbreaks have infected hundreds of thousands of Internet servers and user machines within minutes, 1 causing billions of dollars in losses for businesses, governments, and service providers. 2 CodeRed, for example, affected more than 359,000 Web servers in 14 hours; Slammer achieved its maximum Internet-wide scanning rate (55 million scans per second) in a few minutes. The high stakes involved have inspired numerous research projects, through which industry and academic institutions are working to strengthen local-area and wide-area networked systems' abilities to fend off cyberattacks.
To that end, we propose deploying fast, scalable security overlay networks based on distributed hash tables (DHTs) 3 to facilitate high-speed intrusion detection and alert-information exchange. Fortifying the Internet infrastructure with such a solution could benefit many security-sensitive applications, such as digital government, critical infrastructures, grid computing, e-commerce, and law enforcement. The broader impacts are far reaching in science, education, business, and homeland security.
An effective system for worm detection and cyberspace defense must have the following capabilities:
• robustness and resilience in performing security functions in real-life Internet environments; 4, 5 • cooperation among multiple sites, enabled by trust integration and alert-correlation methodologies; 6 • responsiveness to unexpected worm or flooding attacks, enabled by fast anomaly detection and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) defense; 7 and • efficiency and scalability, enabled by fast worm-signature detection and dissemination, 8 as well as accurate traffic monitoring for tracking DDoS attack-transit routers. 9 With these attack-resilience goals in mind, we are developing a prototype NetShield cyberspace defense system 6 for containing the spread of worms and defending against DDoS flooding attacks (http://gridsec.usc.edu/). Here, we focus on two major components in the NetShield system: the WormShield system for detecting and disseminating worm signatures and a traffic-monitoring scheme for tracking DDoS flooding attacks. We present experimental results for these two component systems derived from large-scale simulations.
DHT-based security overlay networks
Many researchers have suggested the use of overlay networks for security services, building on collaborative nodes to support fast alert correlation and group communications. 4, 5 Network-layer overlays built with virtual links by IP tunneling are generally faster for message forwarding than popular application-layer overlays, such as peer-topeer (P2P) networks. However, introducing new functionality into network-layer overlays requires modifications to OS kernels and other infrastructure features, which makes them impractical for ordinary users. To address this fact, we've explored the use of distributed P2P networks with DHT systems for fast, resilient look-up services.
The idea is to maintain structured overlay networks among participating peers and use simple message routing rather than flooding. The basic functionality that DHTs provide is in the lookup(key) operation, which returns the identity of the node in which the ob-ject with the specified key is stored. When a node issues a lookup(key) request, the system routes the lookup message to the node responsible for the key. DHT systems can guarantee to finish a lookup operation in O(log N) hops for a network with N nodes. This implies that the DHT overlay is scalable to very large networks. Figure 1 illustrates the NetShield architecture, which is built on a DHT-based overlay network that integrates multiple security services including attack/intrusion monitoring, detection and defense, alert correlation, and security-update delivery. Our design is based on the Chord system, 3 which emphasizes efficient routing, reliability, scalability, robustness to failure, and self-organization. We extend the DHT overlay to withstand DDoS, routing, and storage-and-retrieval attacks.
Our approach differs from the Domino 10 and Security Overlay Service (SOS) 4 systems in that we propose an integrated architecture for various security services at the P2P level. We aim to reduce the communication overhead by using DHT lookup(key) functionality. NetShield also supports encrypted tunneling over multiple domains, multicast-based authentication, dissemination of newly detected worm signatures, and security binding in Internet services.
Internet worm detection and containment
Recent seminal work suggests that automatically generating worm signatures by analyzing payload contents and address dispersion offers promising results (see the "Related work in worm containment" sidebar on p. 32 for an overview). However, most scanning worms are dispersed over the entire Internet when they start to spread. In the early stages, it's difficult to observe significant anomalies and accumulate enough payload contents with worms at individual edge networks. Instead, we need to correlate information from multiple edge networks to detect worm signatures quickly and accurately-especially for flash worms.
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To face this challenge, we developed the WormShield Figure 1 . The NetShield system architecture and trust integration over a distributed hash table (DHT) overlay. The system performs trust management across multiple administrative domains, suppresses Internet worm outbreaks, and defends against distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) flooding attacks. worm-signature detection and characterization system, which is designed to identify and contain unknown worms before they infect most vulnerable hosts. The system includes a set of geographically distributed monitors located in multiple administrative domains. 8 These monitors are self-organized into a structured P2P overlay network based on the Chord algorithm. 3 Each monitor is deployed on the edge network's demilitarized zone (DMZ), where it analyzes all incoming packets passing through it. Figure 2 shows an example WormShield network with six sites deployed. Figure 3 illustrates the worm-signature detection and dissemination process. Each WormShield monitor i uses the Rabin footprint algorithm 12 to compute the content blocks in packet payloads. It then updates the local prevalence table for each content block j, denoted by L(i, j), which tracks the number of occurrences of content block j observed by monitor i. It also remembers the set of source addresses S(i, j) and destination addresses D(i, j) corresponding to content block j. Once L(i, j) is greater than a local prevalence threshold T l and the address dispersion |S(i, j)| + |D(i, j)| is greater than a local address-dispersion threshold T s , monitor i starts to update the global prevalence P(i, j) as well as the global address dispersion C( j) for content block j.
Signature generation and dissemination
For each content block, we select a root monitor using the consistent hashing scheme in Chord, which works by mapping arbitrary content blocks to the monitors in a loadbalanced manner. 3 The root monitor maintains its corresponding content block's aggregated prevalence and address dispersion. When P( j) is greater than a global prevalence threshold T p , and C( j) is greater than an address-dispersion threshold T c , the root monitor identifies the content block j as a potential worm signature. It then constructs a multicast tree on the overlay network and disseminates the signature to all monitors in the WormShield network.
Each monitor could automatically deploy the received worm signature in local signature-based intrusion detection systems, such as Snort (www.snort.org) or Bro (http://bro-ids.org), or define different policies for importing signatures generated by other root monitors. For example, they might notify local security administrators before activating signature filtering or rate limiting.
Simulated worm-spreading experiments
We evaluated WormShield with a large-scale simulation using a method similar to that employed by David Moore and colleagues 7 and Hyang-Ah Kim and Brad Karp. We truncated all address blocks that were larger than class B networks (/16 network, so-called because its network prefix is the first 16 bits) because it's unreasonable to attempt to monitor class A networks (/8 network) with only one monitor. We also ignored address blocks smaller than class C networks (/24 network) because those address blocks often represent router link interfaces rather than potentially vulnerable end hosts. In the end, we identified 6,378 vulnerable ASes and 61,216 vulnerable edge networks (containing at least one vulnerable host). Like Kim and Karp, we assumed that 50 percent of the address space within the vulnerable ASes was populated with reachable hosts, and that 25 percent of those hosts were running Web servers. Given that CodeRed worms send infecting packets only after establishing TCP connections with targets, only 1/8 of the address space within those vulnerable ASes would receive TCP payloads with infecting packets.
We simulated a CodeRedI-v2-like worm, which uniformly probes the entire IP address space except for 244.0.0.0/8 (multicast) and 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback), as these are invalid addresses for any end host. We also simulated a CodeRedII-like worm, which probes a completely random IP address 1/8 of the time, addresses in the same class A network half the time, and addresses in the same class B network 3/8 of the time. Both worms sent 10 probes per second and began the simulation with 25 infected hosts. Figure 4a shows the infection progress for these two simulated worms. The results for the CodeRedI-v2 worm are very similar to Moore and colleagues' simulation. Because CodeRedII uses subnet-preferred scanning, which is biased toward probing hosts in local subnets rather than uniform scanning, it spreads much faster-CodeRedII infected 50 percent of the vulnerable population (169,326 hosts) in 66 minutes, whereas CodeRedI-v2 took 219 minutes to infect the same number of hosts. 
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Chord protocol Figure 4b shows the number of vulnerable hosts infected when WormShield succeeds in detecting the worm signature. We plot the results as a function of the global prevalence threshold required to trigger signature detection. In this experiment, we monitored 1 percent of the vulnerable edge networks (612 out of 61,216 networks) with both independent monitors and collaborative WormShield monitors.
When the global prevalence threshold was 1,000-often the number required in distinguishing innocent content blocks-the worm infected 223,510 hosts before the average independent monitors succeeded in detecting its signature. Even the best independent monitors detected worm signatures only after 35,219 hosts were infected. WormShield monitors, on the other hand, detected the signatures by the time 1,354, 8,127, and 18,287 hosts were infected (for local prevalence thresholds of 10, 100, and 500, respectively). Figure 4c plots the effect of the local-prevalence threshold required to trigger global-prevalence updates. With a global threshold of 100,000, the number of infected hosts at detection time increased only slightly when the local threshold increased from 10 to 1,000. For a global threshold of 10,000, however, the number of infected hosts at detection time increased from 9,482 to 35,897 when the local threshold increased from 200 to 1000. This suggests that the local threshold must be set at a value smaller than 200 for a global threshold of 10,000.
We also compared WormShield's signature-detection speeds when different fractions of the vulnerable edge networks were monitored. Figure 4d shows the number of vulnerable hosts infected at detection time when 61, 612, 6,121 and 30,608 edge networks were monitored. With independent monitors, worm-detection speeds didn't improve as we increased the number of monitors. Because WormShield monitors work collaboratively, however, total infected hosts at detection time decreased from 77,889 to 4,063 as we increased the number of monitored edge networks.
Fast and accurate traffic monitoring
Spreading worms often trigger DDoS flooding attacks. Effective containment of worms can significantly reduce the number of infected hosts, as well as stem the creation of "zombie" end-user machines that can be used later as attackers. However, we can't completely prevent DDoS attacks by simply containing worm outbreaks. Backbone ISPs often need to monitor traffic volumes among routers to identify attack-transit routers (ATRs)-ingress routers that unwittingly forward malicious DDoS attack flows.
The network traffic matrix (TM), which represents the amount of traffic in bytes, packets, or flows between ingress and egress routers, is very useful for identifying ATRs. We consider packet-level TM (PTM) and flowlevel TM (FTM). We proposed a cardinality-based TMmeasurement approach (CBTM) for both PTM and FTM. We denote X(t k ) as the TM for time slot t k . Let S i + (t k ) be the set of traffic entering the network from ingress router r i during t k and S j -(t k ) be the set of traffic leaving from egress router r j during t k . According to the definition of TM, we have
Obviously, it's impractical to collect all original traffic from routers and perform the union operations. Instead, we compress traffic sets S i + (t k ) and S j -(t k ) into very small cardinality summaries at routers r i and r j , denoted by C i + (t k ) and C j -(t k ). We estimate |S i + (t k )| and |S j -(t k )| from C j + (t k ) and C j -(t k ), respectively, using our proposed adaptive cardinality counting algorithm, 9 which extends the LogLog counting algorithm designed by Marianne Durand and Philippe Flajolet.
14 By max-merging C i + (t k ) and C j -(t k ), we can also estimate | S i + (t k ) È S j -(t k ) | from the merged cardinality summary.
For PTM, we use the invariant IP header fields and first few bytes of payload as a packet identity. We then compress packet traffic data into cardinality summaries using their identities. For FTM, we compress IP flows at each router using five-tuple flow identities consisting of source IP addresses and port numbers, destination IP addresses and port numbers, and protocol identifiers. In CBTM, each cardinality summary takes only O(log log N) storage capacity to record the traffic set of N packets or flows. 9 For example, we need only 640 Kbytes of storage to record traffic data at 40 Gbits-per-second line speed. Figure 5 illustrates our trace-driven simulation results on the accuracy of PTM and FTM monitoring. To better understand the error distribution among TM elements, we use the root-mean-squared relative error (RMSRE) metrics. 15 For a given percentage of traffic, RMSRE reflects the average relative error of the largest TM elements whose traffic sum is that percentage of the total traffic in 
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all elements. Figure 5 shows that when all traffic is taken into account, the RMSRE of PTM and FTM with cardinality summaries of 640 Kbytes are 0.038 and 0.042, respectively. However, when we consider only 90 percent of the traffic in the largest elements, both decrease to 0.021 and 0.022, respectively. Similar trends hold for estimations with cardinality summaries of 160 Kbytes. Monitoring the spatial and temporal behaviors of PTM and FTM can help ISP operators track DDoS flooding attacks. During a flooding attack, the victim often receives a large surge of small flows because flooding packets usually have randomly spoofed source IP addresses. Because they don't use sampling on packets, our FTMs can capture all these small flows. The egress router to the victim can identify the ATRs (as illustrated in Figure 6 ) by correlating the PTM and FTM. The ATRs often show significant increases in the number of flows but no corresponding increase in the number of packets to the victim. For increased packets ⌬P i,j (t k ) and flows ⌬F i,j (t k ) from ingress router r i to the victim's egress router r j in time slot t k , we can estimate the average size of new flows z i (t k ) at router r i as z i (t k ) = ⌬P i,j (t k )/⌬F i,j (t k ). Therefore, if an ingress router has exceptionally large ⌬F i,j (t k ) and small z i (t k ), we can identify it as a suspected ATR. Anukool Lakhina and colleagues also use the time serials of PTM and FTM to diagnose various network anomalies, including DDoS attacks. 16 Our fast PTM and FTM monitoring can provide very useful online inputs for Lakhina's algorithm to diagnose DDoS flooding attacks.
O ur large-scale simulation showed that deploying collaborative WormShield monitors on just 1 percent of the vulnerable edge networks can let us detect worm signatures roughly 10 times faster than with independent monitors. To handle the major threats posed today by software vulnerabilities and naïve users, we plan to develop a trust-negotiation layer on top of the P2P overlay network to coordinate distributed detection and defense activities. This subsystem will identify and isolate compromised peers to help minimize negative effects. Providing the means to isolate compromised peers could also let ISPs and other administrative entities share attack data and request response actions from entities that remain trusted.
In swiftly dealing with worm outbreaks, the major research challenge is still in containment. In particular, we need automated signature generation and fast suppression of malicious flows. We're in the process of implementing the WormShield system and will evaluate its performance with real worm-spreading experiments on the Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research (Deter) test bed (www.isi.edu/deter/). We will also evaluate our PTM and FTM correlation schemes to diagnose network-wide traffic anomalies caused by DDoS flooding attacks in a real-life environment. Their project also enhances containment through collaboration among containment devices.
Cliff Zou and colleagues proposed a worm-monitoring and early warning system, called trend detection (http://tennis.ecs.umass.edu/ czou/research.htm). 4 Based on some worm-propagation dynamic models, the trend detection system detects the presence of a worm in its early stage by using a Kalman filter estimation algorithm. 
